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Abstract. We study the computational complexity of an important property of simple, regular
and weighted games, which is decisiveness. We show that this concept can naturally be represented
in the context of hypergraph theory, and that decisiveness can be decided for simple games in quasi-
polynomial time, and for regular and weighted games in polynomial time. The strongness condition
poses the main difficulties, while properness reduces the complexity of the problem, especially if it
is amplified by regularity. On the other hand, regularity also allows to specify the problem instances
much more economically, implying a reconsideration of the corresponding complexity measure that,
as we prove, has important structural as well as algorithmic consequences.
Keywords: Simple Game, Regular Game, Weighted Game, Hypergraph, Strongness, Decisiveness,
Complexity
1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory where a subsetX of players of an entirety A, forming
a coalition, can achieve a common benefit. Unlike non-cooperative games, where each player is competing
individually against the others, here the focus is cooperation. We shall concentrate on simple games that
specify which subsets X of the collective A are winning coalitions; i.e. can impose their common will,
if they have one. We will examine important properties that some simple games may have. Given all
its minimal winning coalitions, we will ask if the given game is proper, strong, decisive, regular, linear,
weighted, homogeneous or majority. So we will pose decision problems concerning simple games, and we
will try to characterize the computational complexity of these decision problems.
In [4] the authors conjectured that given all the minimal winning coalitions of a simple game, the
problem of deciding if this game is decisive —or self-dual— is coNP-complete. However, we will show that
this decisive problem can be solved in quasi-polynomial time; that is, it can be solved by an algorithm
which runs in a time bounded by a sub-exponential function, which is not necessarily polynomial. In [18]
the authors proved that verifying that a game is weighted —or threshold [14] or a trade robust game [28]—
is in P . But in [4] the authors conjectured that deciding if a weighted game is decisive, is coNP-complete.
We will prove that this conjecture is most probably wrong too (unless NP = P ), because this problem is
also in P . Actually, the decisive problem is polynomial even for linear games [29] —also called complete
games [2], ordered games [26], swap-robust games [29] or 2-monotone Boolean functions [30]— which are
simple games whose players can be ordered forming a regular game [14] —also known as directed game
[11]—; a class that includes weighted games.
Finally —going definitely beyond of what we already have stated in [25]— we shall drop the assump-
tion that the given games are always specified by their minimal winning coalitions; and prove that regular
games can be given in a more economic way so that if we now measure the computational time according
to this smaller input size, the mentioned algorithm of [18] ceases to be polynomial. The corresponding
decisive problem turns out be at least as complex as for simple games.
In the following section, we introduce hypergraphs to review the main basic definitions. In Section 3,
we define the decisive problem and show that it is quasi-polynomial, using the well known result of [3].
In Section 4, we define regularity, weightedness and homogeneity, showing that one can recognize any
of these properties in polynomial time; and moreover, if one of them holds, also decide decisiveness in
⋆ This author was supported by grant BecasChile of the “National Commission for Scientific and Technological
Research of Chile” (CONICYT) of the Chilean Government.
time polynomial in the input size. In Section 5, we concentrate on regular games, proving that for such
games the minimal winning coalitions yield, in fact, an inflated measure of the input size. In Section 6,
we recapitulate considering more than proper games.
2 Hypergraphs and simple games
Definition 1. Given a finite ground set A —and its power set P(A)— a hypergraph defined over A is
a family H ⊆ P(A) of hyperedges X ⊆ A.
We may represent hypergraphs H as incidence matrices, such that their rows represent the incidence
vectors x : A → {0, 1} of the hyperedges X ∈ H. So, given a ∈ A, x(a) = 1 iff a ∈ X. The size of H,
i.e., the amount of bits needed in order to write down the family of incidence vectors that characterize
the hypergraph, is |A| · |H| ∈ N.
Definition 2. Given a hypergraph H, let be:
– ¬(H) := {A\X ;X ∈ H} the family of complements of elements of H.
– µ(H) := {X ∈ H; ∀Z ∈ H, Z 6⊂ X} the family of irredundant —or minimal— elements of H.
– ν(H) := {Z ⊆ A; ∃X ∈ H, X ⊆ Z} the family of subsets of A that respond to H.
– τ(H) := {Z ⊆ A; ∀X ∈ H, X ∩ Z 6= ∅} the family of subsets of A that are transversal to H.
– λ(H) := µ(τ(H)) the family of irredundant elements that are transversal to H.
Example 1. The following six tables represent a hypergraph H over A := {3, 2, 1}, as well as the five
families one obtains applying the defined operators. In each table the first row represents the ground set
A, and the rest of the rows present the incidence matrix that determines the denoted hypergraph.
A 321
H 011
100
111
A 321
¬(H) 000
011
100
A 321
µ(H) 011
100
A 321
ν(H) 011
100
101
110
111
A 321
τ(H) 101
110
111
A 321
λ(H) 101
110
Let us recall some basic equations [21]:
Lemma 1. Given H ⊆ P(A), P(A)\ν(H) = ¬(τ(H)), τ(ν(H)) = τ(H) and τ(τ(H)) = ν(H).
Proof. The first equation follows directly from the definitions. The monotony of ν —if H ⊆ H′, then
ν(H) ⊆ ν(H′)— together with the antitony of τ —if H ⊆ H′, then τ(H) ⊇ τ(H′)— immediately imply
τ(ν(H)) ⊆ τ(H). Conversely, if Z ∈ τ(H), then ∀X ∈ H, X 6⊆ A\Z; so ∀Y ∈ ν(H), Y 6⊆ A\Z. To prove
the third equation, note that τ(τ(H)) = {Y ⊆ A; ∀X ⊆ A, Y ⊆ A\X implies X 6∈ τ(H)}; so the first
equation implies τ(τ(H)) = {Y ⊆ A; ∀X ⊆ A, Y ⊆ A\X implies A\X ∈ ν(H)} = ν(H).
Shortly after mathematical hypergraph theory was consolidated [1], it was already used to analyze
cooperative games [20], although corresponding complexity considerations are quite new.
Definition 3. A simple game is a pair Γ := (A,W), where A is a finite set of players and W ⊆ P(A)
is a family of winning coalitions, such that for all X ∈ W, X ⊆ Z implies Z ∈ W. So W is a hypergraph
over A, with ν(W) = W. In other words, the Boolean function f : P(A) → {0, 1} determined by the
hypergraph W —such that W = {X ⊆ A; f(A) = 1}— is monotone. Therefore we also say that simple
games are monotone.
Then µ(W), the irredundant kernel of Γ , is the family of minimal winning coalitions; τ(W) is the
blocker of W; and L := P(A)\W = {X ⊆ A; f(A) = 0} = ¬(τ(W)) is the set of losing coalitions. We
do not demand ∅ ∈ L, so L can be void. The simple game (A, τ(W)) is called the dual game of (A,W).
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3 Decisiveness in simple games
Definition 4. A simple game (A,W) is:
– proper, if for all S ⊆ A, S ∈ W ⇒ A\S /∈ W, i.e. W ⊆ τ(W),
– strong, if for all S ⊆ A, S /∈ W ⇒ A\S ∈ W, i.e. W ⊇ τ(W), and
– decisive, if it is both strong and proper, i.e. W = τ(W).
In [29] we read: Properness rules out the possibility of disjoint winning coalitions, while strongness
rules out the possibility of two losing coalitions whose union is A . . . Some authors who view simple games
as models of voting systems have little interest in simple games that are not proper. Their argument is
that disjoint winning coalitions can allow contradictory decisions to be made by the voting body. . . . A
less vigorous argument is sometimes raised against games that are not strong, and thus, the argument
goes, leave some issues unresolved. Ramamurthy (1990) refers to “the paralysis that may result from
allowing a losing coalition to obstruct a decision.” So, ideally, games should be decisive; and this is why
this property interests us so much.
Definition 5. [21] A pair of hypergraphs (H,K) over the same ground set is:
– coherent, if ν(H) ⊆ τ(K),
– complete, if ν(H) ⊇ τ(K), and
– dual, if it is both coherent and complete, i.e. ν(H) = τ(K).
Lemma 2. Given a simple game Γ := (A,W), then:
– Γ is proper, iff (W ,W) is coherent.
– Γ is strong, iff (W ,W) is complete.
– Γ is decisive, iff (W ,W) is dual.
Proof. Just note that:
(W ,W) is coherent iff ν(W) ⊆ τ(W) iff W ⊆ τ(W), i.e. iff Γ is proper.
(W ,W) is complete iff ν(W) ⊇ τ(W) iff W ⊇ τ(W), i.e. iff Γ is strong.
(W ,W) is dual iff ν(W) = τ(W) iff W = τ(W), i.e. iff Γ is decisive.
Note that for any hypergraph H, ν(µ(H)) = ν(H) and τ(µ(H)) = τ(H). So let (H,K) be a pair of
hypergraphs and Γ := (A,W) a simple game, then:
(H,K) is dual iff (µ(H), µ(K)) is dual Γ := (A,W) is decisive iff (µ(W), µ(W)) is dual
(H,K) is coherent iff (µ(H), µ(K)) is coherent Γ := (A,W) is proper iff (µ(W), µ(W)) is coherent
(H,K) is complete iff (µ(H), µ(K)) is complete Γ := (A,W) is strong iff (µ(W), µ(W)) is complete
Example 2. In projective geometry, the Fano Plane is the smallest projective plane. It was introduced
in simple game theory by [24] to define a subclass of simple games called finite projective games. Since
then, it has been very much studied, due to it has special properties that make it a likely counterexample
for different results —for instance, without going into details, it is the only non-partition game with the
same number of minimal winning coalitions and players [26]— as well as a case in which some properties
turn out to be the same —for instance, its reactive bargaining set coincides with its kernel [6].
It can be represented by a hypergraph H over A := {7, . . . , 1}, with seven evenly distributed hyper-
edges represented by the following incidence matrix. It is easy to check that µ(H) = H and prove that
(H,H) is coherent. It is more difficult to prove the completeness of this pair —see the next Corollary
1— but in fact it is dual. So the game Γ := (A, ν(H)) is proper and strong; i.e. decisive.
A 7654321
H 0000111
0011010
0101100
0110001
1001001
1010100
1100010
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Given a simple game Γ := (A,W), since for any hypergraph H we have µ(ν(H)) = µ(H), we may
assume that only µ(W) is extensively specified; that the rest of W is only implicitly defined by µ(W).
Because given any Z ⊆ A, deciding if Z ∈ W can be done efficiently: Simply visit all X ∈ H, every time
deciding X ⊆ Z; something that can be done in at most |A| units of computation time. So the amount
of information needed to specify Γ is given by the size |A| · |µ(W)| of µ(W). This explains the following
easy but important result:
Corollary 1. For simple games Γ := (A,W),
1. decide properness is polynomial.
2. decide strongness is coNP-complete.
3. decide decisiveness is quasi-polynomial; i.e. there exists a decision algorithm whose logarithm of the
running time is polynomial in the logarithm of the input size.
Proof. The three statements rely on Lemma 2. Statement (1) follows because, as ν is a monotone operator,
(H,H) is coherent iff ∀X,Z ∈ H, X ∩ Z 6= ∅, a condition that can be verified in polynomial time.
Statement (2) follows because it has been proven many times [22] that the completeness of a pair of
hypergraphs (H,K), poses a decision problem that is coNP-complete. Moreover, this not necessarily
symmetric problem can polynomially be reduced to the symmetric one [3]. Statement (3) follows from a
deep result, proving that duality of a pair of hypergraphs (H,K) can be decided in quasi-polynomial time,
since there is a sub-exponential algorithm [3] whose logarithms of the running times can be bounded by
a polynom of the logarithms of the sizes of the pairs.
Note that therefore the decisive problem is most probably not NP-hard, unless any NP-complete
problem can be solved in quasi-polynomial time. But note also that the mentioned quasi-polynomial
algorithm does not allow us to generate λ(H) := µ(τ(H)) in sub-exponential time, since |λ(H)| can not
be quasi-polynomially bounded by |µ(H)|. To prove this statement, consider the following example:
Example 3. Let be m ∈ N, I := {m, . . . , 1}, n := 2m, A := {n, . . . , 1} and H := {{2i, 2i − 1}; i ∈ I}.
Then, of course, λ(H) = {Y ⊆ A; ∀i ∈ I, 2i ∈ Y or (exclusive) 2i− 1 ∈ Y }. So |H| = m but |λ(H)| = 2m.
4 Regular and weighted games
Definition 6. Let ≤ denote a linear order on A which orders the players by increasing power. Given
X ⊆ A, an increasing-shift on X, specified by a pair (a, b) ∈ A\X ×X such that a > b, is an operation
which returns Z := X\{b} ∪ {a}.
A simple game (A,W) is regular with respect to the given linear order [18,12] if for all X ∈ W, every
increasing-shift returns an element of W; i.e. if replacing a member of a winning coalition X ∈ W by a
more powerful one, always yields a winning coalition.
It is clear that a simple game (A,W) is regular iff ∀X ∈ µ(W) every increasing-shift returns an
element of W . So, to decide the regularity of W , one can restrict the attention to H := µ(W), resulting
that regularity can be decided in time polynomial in |H|. In fact, this recognition problem can be solved
in linear time [12].
Regular games are —in a sense that we shall reconsider in Section 5— very tractable; i.e. there exist
algorithms [19] that given H := |µ(W)|, generate λ(H) in linear time; and at the same time prove that
|λ(H)| ≤ |A| · |H|+ 1.
Definition 7. A simple game (A,W) is linear [29] —or 2-monotonic [19]— if there exists a linear
re-ordering of A, for which W becomes regular.
The linearity ofW can also be decided in time polynomial in |µ(W)|; since if one identifies X ∈ µ(W),
a ∈ A\X and b ∈ X with a > b and {a} ∪ X\{b} 6∈ ν(H), then, to have a chance to obtain a regular
re-ordering, the order a > b has to be reversed; definitively. And such definitive re-ordering can be exe-
cuted at most n · (n− 1)/2 times, where n := |A| [12].
The Fano plane of Example 2 is clearly not regular, and by its symmetry, not linear.
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Definition 8. A weighted game is a simple game Γ := (A,W) that can be specified by a threshold
criterion (q, p) —also known as weighted representation— where p : A → R+ is a weight function and
q ∈ R+ a quota such that for all Z ⊆ A, Z ∈ W iff p(Z) ≥ q; where p(Z) := Σ{p(a); a ∈ Z}. Γ is
homogeneous if it has a threshold criterion such that ∀X ∈ µ(W), p(X) = q.
It is well known that each weighted game has a canonical weighted representation.
Weighted games were defined in 1944 by [16] and deeply studied in 1956 by [8], in the context of simple
game theory. Since then they have been studied in many different contexts and under different names,
like linearly separated truth function [13] —to contact and to rectify nets—, linearly separable switching
function or threshold Boolean functions [7] —to separate circuits in switching circuit theory and analyse
the threshold synthesis problem—, trade robustness [28] —for voting theory and trade exchanges—
or threshold hypergraphs [5,23] —to synchronize parallel processes. Homogeneous games were also first
defined in [16], and they are one of the most studied subclasses of weighted games [26].
Weighted games clearly are simple (monotone) games, and one can always linearly re-order the
elements of A such that p : A→ R becomes monotone; i.e. for all a, b ∈ A with a < b, p(a) ≤ p(b). And
then clearly the gameW becomes regular. So all weighted games are linear. The converse, however, does
not necessarily hold [29,14].
According to the well known duality of linear inequality systems:
Lemma 3. H yields a weighted game ν(H) iff for all u, u′ : H → N with u · 1 = u′ · 1, u ·H 6≤ u′ ·H ′;
where 1 is the H-vector with all entries equal to 1, and H,H ′ are the H × A-incidence-matrices that
represent H and ¬(H) respectively.
Example 4. It is easy to verify that the simple game (A,W) with W := ν(H), given by the following
hypergraph H = µ(W), is regular. But according to Lemma 3, this game is not weighted: Just choose
u : H → N as indicated in the following table, and u′ := u. In the next Section we will also prove that
this game is decisive.
A 987654321 u
H 011011011 1
011011101 0
011011110 0
011100100 1
011101000 0
011110000 0
100011100 1
100100011 1
100100101 0
100100110 0
100101000 0
100110000 0
101000000 0
110000000 0
Σ(z · u) 222222222 4
The next result was proven in [18], but not for homogeneous games.
Theorem 1. Deciding whether a given simple game Γ := (A,W) is weighted (homogeneous) or not, can
be done in time polynomial in the size of H := µ(W).
Proof. The following procedure is efficient for both kind of games, since each Step can be accomplished
in polynomial time: The first four were already commented above, and Steps 5 to 8 only demand the
solution of a system of linear equalities and inequalities, which can also be found in polynomial time
[10]. Note that in Step 8 the original restriction demands that for each loser Y ∈ J , p(Y ) < q; but this
can equivalently be replaced by ∀Y ∈ J , p(Y ) ≤ q − 1, because multiplying a threshold criterion by a
positive constant, returns a threshold criterion.
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Algorithm 1 IsWeighted
Input: The irredundant kernel H := µ(W) of a simple game Γ := (A,W).
Output: If Γ is weighted (homogeneous), return “Yes”; otherwise return “No”.
1: Decide if H is linear;
2: If this is not the case, then return “No”;
3: Determine a linear ordering of A which makes H regular;
4: Generate J := ¬(λ(H));
5: Decide the existence of a threshold criterion (q, p), such that:
6: ∀a ∈ A, p(a) ≥ 0;
7: ∀X ∈ H, p(X) ≥ q (p(X) = q);
8: ∀Y ∈ J , p(Y ) ≤ q − 1;
9: If this is not the case, then return “No”;
10: Return “Yes” — Γ is weighted (homogeneous).
Next we will prove a similar result, but now regarding decisive games:
Definition 9. A weighted game Γ := (A,W) is a sub-majority game, if it is strong; and it is a majority
game, if it is decisive.
In [4] the authors conjecture that verifying majority games is coNP-complete. This conjecture is most
probably false (unless P=NP ), because:
Theorem 2. Deciding whether a given simple game Γ := (A,W) is majority (sub-majority) or not, can
be done in time polynomial in the size of H := µ(W).
Proof. Analogously to Theorem 1, the following Algorithm 2 is efficient to decide both kind of games.
First note that by Definition 4, Γ is decisive iff τ(W) =W , so applying the operator µ on the expression
we obtain λ(W) = µ(W), by Definition 2. In the same way, Γ is strong iff τ(W) ⊆ W iff λ(W) ⊆ µ(W).
Moreover, it is easy to see that λ(µ(W)) = λ(W). Using these ideas, we test decisiveness or strongness
on Steps 4-5, through the following questions: is λ(H) = H? or, respectively, is λ(H) ⊆ ν(H)? which are
equivalent to the two conditions given above. Finally, the procedure to decide whether the game is also
weighted or homogeneous is the same as the given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 IsMajority
Input: The irredundant kernel H := µ(W) of a simple game Γ := (A,W).
Output: If Γ is majority (sub-majority), return “Yes”; otherwise return “No”.
1: Decide if H is linear;
2: If this is not the case, then return “No”;
3: Generate K := λ(H);
4: Decide if K = H (K ⊆ ν(H));
5: If this is not the case, then return “No”;
6: Decide the existence of a threshold criterion (q, p), such that:
7: ∀a ∈ A, p(a) ≥ 0;
8: ∀X ∈ H, p(X) ≥ q;
9: ∀Y ∈ ¬(K), p(Y ) ≤ q − 1;
10: If this is not the case, then return “No”;
11: Return “Yes” — Γ is majority (sub-majority).
It is known that up to eight players, all the simple games which are regular and decisive are also
majority. This implies that Step 6 of Algorithm 2 is unnecessary in these cases, because the answer would
always be “Yes”. However, from nine players onwards, this is not always true. It is known that for |A| = 9
there are 319124 regular and decisive games [11], but only 175428 majority games [15].
As far as we know, explicit examples of regular games which are decisive but not weighted, as our
Example 4, have not been indicated until now. However, another regular game that in fact meets these
characteristics is given in [27].
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5 Economic specification of regular games
The considerations that in the last section led from simple games to weighted ones, revealed the central
importance of regular games. Mainly because to prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we had to rely on the
main result of [18], which, given the minimal winning coalitions µ(W) of a regular game Γ := (A,W),
allows to generate the family of the irredundant transversal λ(W) in polynomial time, in function of the
input size. But there is, as we will see, a much more economic way to determine regular games; one that
will demand a reconsideration of the recalled polynomiallity results.
Since in what follows we restrict the attention to regular games, we may assume that A = {n, n −
1, . . . , 1}.
Definition 10. Given X ⊆ A, a left-shift on X is either an increasing-shift —see Definition 6— specified
by a pair (a, b) ∈ A\X ×X, such that a = b+ 1; or, if 1 ∈ A\X, a replacement of X by X ∪ {1}.
Given X,Z ⊆ A we say that Z is a successor of X, if a left-shift performed on X yields Z; i.e. if
there exist a ∈ A\X and b ∈ X ∪ {0}, such that a = b+ 1 and Z := X\{b} ∪ {a}. So we can conceive a
directed successor graph on the set of nodes P(A) such that, given X,Z ⊆ A, (X,Z) is an arrow of the
graph, if Z is a successor of X.
We write X ⊆′ Z if, starting with X, there exists a sequence of left-shifts that produces Z. It is quite
clear that a sequence of left-shifts starting with X can not re-produce X —unless the sequence is empty—
so the successor graph is acyclic. The relation ⊆′ is the reflexive-and-transitive closure of that successor
graph. So it is an order relation, that we shall call shift order.
Given X,Z ⊆ A, X ⊆′ Z iff for all a ∈ A, |{b ∈ X ; b ≥ a}| ≤ |{b ∈ Z; b ≥ a}|; because if Z is a
successor of X , then the stated inequalities evidently hold; and, the other way round, if the inequalities
hold, then starting from X , one can always perform a sequence of left-shifts that preserve the inequalities
to finally produce Z. So this shift relation can be decided in time polynomial in n. And it is also clear
that, if X ⊆ Z, then X ⊆′ Z; i.e. that ⊆′ is a monotone variation of ⊆. And that for ⊆′ —as for ⊆—
complementation is antitone; i.e. if X ⊆′ Z, then A\Z ⊆′ A\X .
The operators ν′, τ ′, µ′, λ′ are defined like the already familiar ν, τ, µ, λ —see Definition 2— but with
the relation ⊆′ instead of ⊆. For instance, given H ⊆ P(A), τ ′(H) := {Z ⊆ A; ∀X ∈ H, X 6⊆′ A\Z}, and
µ′(W) := {X ∈ W ; ∀Z ∈ W , Z 6⊂′ X} yields the shift-minimal winning coalitions of the given game.
Note that, given a hypergraphW over A, (A,W) is a regular game iff ν′(W) =W . This is so because
we always have ν′(W) ⊇ ν(W) ⊇ W . So ν′(W) = ν(W) =W is equivalent to ν′(W) ⊆ W . Hence regular
games are ⊆′-monotone games, as simple games are ⊆-monotone games.
Some of these notions and results are known since [17].
Lemma 4. A simple game Γ := (A,W) is regular iff W = ν′(H′), where H′ := µ′(H).
If Γ is regular, then τ(W) = τ ′(W), so its dual game (A, τ(W)) is regular too. Therefore
a regular Γ is proper iff ν′(W) ⊆ τ ′(W); is strong iff ν′(W) ⊇ τ ′(W); and is decisive iff ν′(W) = τ ′(W).
Proof. The above mentioned monotone variation, together with the definition of H′, imply ν(W) ⊆
ν′(W) = ν′(H′). So, to prove the first statement, it only remains to point out that regularity of (A,W)
is equivalent to ν′(W) ⊆ ν(W). The second statement follows from the variation of Lemma 1 that one
obtains replacing ⊆ by ⊆′. Note that the given proof of Lemma 1 holds for any order relation on P(A)
for which complementation is antitone.
Hence, to implicitly specify a regular game (A,W), it suffices to explicitly specify H′ := µ′(W) ⊆
H := µ(W): Given any Z ⊆ A, one can decide Z ∈ W , simply visiting all X ∈ H′, every time deciding
X ⊆′ Z.
Example 5. Consider the regular game of Example 4, specified over there by a hypergraph H.
Its economic specification H′ is the following; because all other X ∈ H are such that X ∈ ν′(H′).
A 987654321 u
H′ 011011011 1
011100100 1
100011100 1
100100011 1
100101000 0
101000000 0
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Until now we have assumed that not only simple games Γ := (A,W) but also, in particular, regular
games, will be characterized by µ(W); and that therefore the time needed to decide questions concerning
simple games, should be measured using the simple-measure κ(Γ ) := |A| · |µ(W)|; the size of µ(W). But
if we limit the attention to the universe of regular games Γ := (A,W), since we now know that they
can also be characterized by µ′(W), then it seems to be reasonable that the deciding times should be
measured using the regular-measure κ′(Γ ) := |A| · |µ′(W)|; the size of µ′(W). One reason for this, is that
the characterization in question turns out to be efficient, since for all Z ⊆ A, Z ∈ W can be decided in
polynomial time in function of κ′(Γ ). Another reason is, that for all regular games Γ := (A,W), since
µ′(W) ⊆ µ(W), also κ′(Γ ) ≤ κ(Γ ).
But in our opinion this adaptation to the universe of regular games is moreover mandatory, because
κ would yield an inflated measure for regular games, compared with κ′, since there exist sequences
{Γm;m ∈ N} of regular games, such that κ(Γm)/κ′(Γm) grows exponentially in function of m ∈ N. For
instance, if we define Γm such that A := {2m, . . . , 1}, X := {a ∈ A;m ≥ a}, and W := ν′({X}), then
|µ′(W)| = 1 and |µ(W )| =
(
2m
m
)
.
This opinion contradicts the one of the authors of [18]. They proved that there exists a polynom
p : N → N, such that for all n ∈ N, κˆ(n)/κˆ′(n) ≤ p(n); where κˆ(n) := max{κ((A,W)); |A| = n} and
κˆ′(n) := max{κ′((A,W)); |A| = n}. They even proved that the same would still hold, if κ′ would be
replaced by the size of any codification which is able to distinguish different regular games. And based
on this result, they conclude that the simple-measure is a not-inflated measure.
This view, however, forces us to “scan” the universe of regular games partitioning it in “slices”
with constant |A|. But one could as well “scan” it, partitioning it in “slices” of constant κ′(W). Then,
redefining κˆ, κˆ′ accordingly, for any m ∈ N one would have κˆ′(2m) = 2m. But since the above defined
regular game Γm is in the “slice” 2m, κˆ(2m) ≥ 2m ·
(
2m
m
)
. So κˆ(2m)/κˆ′(2m) can not be bounded by a
polynom in m.
For all these reasons we adopt the regular-measure κ′; with all its important consequences:
Definition 11. Let A := {n, . . . , 1} and A′ := {2n, 2n− 1, . . . , 2, 1}.
Let P(A) be ordered according to ⊆ and P(A′) be ordered according to ⊆′.
Let T : P(A)→ P(A′) be such that given X ⊆ A and a ∈ A, 2a ∈ T (X) iff a ∈ X and 2a− 1 ∈ T (X) iff
a 6∈ X.
So T is a monomorphism, because it is an injective function such that for all X,Z ⊆ A, X ⊆ Z iff
T (X) ⊆′ T (Z) —since T (Z) is a successor of T (X) iff Z is a set-theoretical successor, i.e. a superset,
of X.
For any a ∈ A, let Za := {2a} ∪ {{2b− 1; b ∈ A, b ≥ a} ⊆ A′ —see Example 6— and let G′ := {Za; a ∈
A} ⊆ P(A′).
Lemma 5. The image T (P(A)) := {T (X);X ⊆ A} of P(A) is closed with respect to complementation.
Restricting the codomain to T (P(A)), T becomes bijective; i.e. an isomorphism.
Moreover ν′(G′) ∪ T (P(A)) = τ ′(G′).
Proof. The T -image of P(A) covers (only) the X ′ ∈ P(A′) that for all a ∈ A, either satisfy 2a ∈ X ′
or (exclusive) 2a − 1 ∈ X ′. So it is closed with respect to complementation. Let us now prove the last
statement. We have ν′(G′) ∪ T (P(A)) ⊆ τ ′(G′), because if X ′ ∈ ν′(G′) ∪ T (P(A)) and a ∈ A, then
X ′ ⊆′ A′\Za is impossible, since |{b′ ∈ X ′; b′ ≥ 2a − 1}| > n − a = |{b′ ∈ A′\Za; b′ ≥ 2a − 1}|. And
we have ν′(G′) ∪ T (P(A)) ⊇ τ ′(G′), because this inclusion is equivalent to P(A′)\T (P(A)) ⊆ ν′(G′) ∪
ν′(¬(G′)). And, given Z ′ ∈ P(A′)\T (P(A)), let a ∈ A be maximal such that either {2a, 2a− 1} ⊆ Z ′ or
{2a, 2a− 1}∩Z ′ = ∅. Then if the first holds, clearly Za ⊆′ Z ′; and if the second one holds, A′\Za ⊆′ Z ′.
Lemma 6. Given H,K ⊆ P(A), H′ := {T (X);X ∈ H} and K′ := {T (Y );Y ∈ K}.
Then ν(H) ⊆ τ(K) iff ν′(H′ ∪ G′) ⊆ τ ′(K′ ∪ G′), so the pair (H,K) is coherent iff (H′ ∪ G′,K′ ∪ G′) is
coherent;
and ν(H) ⊇ τ(K) iff ν′(H′ ∪ G′) ⊇ τ ′(K′ ∪ G′), so the pair (H,K) is complete iff (H′ ∪ G′,K′ ∪ G′) is
complete.
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Proof. Clearly ν(H) ⊆ τ(K) iff ∀(X,Y ) ∈ H×K, X 6⊆ A\Y ; i.e. iff ∀(X ′, Y ′) ∈ H′×K′, X ′ 6⊆′ A′\Y ′; i.e.
iff ν′(H′) ⊆ τ ′(K′). Moreover our Lemma 5 implies ν′(G′) ⊆ τ ′(G′), ν′(H′) ⊆ τ ′(G′) and ν′(G′) ⊆ τ ′(K′).
So we completed the proof of the first statement. On the other hand, ν(H) ⊇ τ(K) iff ∀Z ∈ P(A)
with A\Z 6∈ ν(K), Z ∈ ν(H); i.e. iff ∀Z ′ ∈ T (P(A)) with A′\Z ′ 6∈ ν′(K′), Z ∈ ν(H′). And since
∀Z ′ ∈ P(A′)\T (P(A)) with A′\Z ′ 6∈ ν′(G′), Z ∈ ν(G′), we have proved the second statement.
From this Lemma, setting H := K := W , and considering that |G′| ≤ |A|, we immediately get the
following:
Theorem 3. The decisiveness (resp. strongness) problem for simple games (A,W) can polynomially
be reduced to the decisiveness (resp. strongness) problem for regular games (A′,W ′), specified by their
shift-minimal winning coalitions µ′(W ′). This implies that the strongness problem for regular games is
coNP-complete. And that if the decisive problem for regular games (A′,W ′) turns out to be polynomial
in |A′| · |µ′(W ′)|, then the decisive problem for simple games (A,W) will be polynomial in |A| · |µ(W)|.
And remembering that T (P(A)) ∩ ν′(G′) = ∅, we immediately get the following:
Corollary 2. Given H ⊆ P(A), let K := λ(H), H′ := {T (X);X ∈ H} and K′ := {T (Y );Y ∈ K}.
Then K′ ⊆ λ′(H′ ∪ G′) = µ′(K′ ∪ G′). Therefore λ(H) can be deduced from λ′(H′ ∪ G′).
Let us now apply our Corollary 2. Reconsider Example 3 at the end of Section 3, where I :=
{m, . . . , 1}, A := {2m, 2m− 1, . . . , 2, 1}, H := {{2i, 2i− 1}; i ∈ I} and K = {Y ⊆ A; ∀i ∈ I, 2i ∈ Y or
(exclusive) 2i − 1 ∈ Y }. Then |G′| = 2m, so |H′ ∪ G′| = 3m. Therefore, with k := 3m, |H′ ∪ G′| = k
and |λ′(H′ ∪ G′)| ≥ |K′| = ck, where c := 21/3 > 1; so the size of the hypergraph λ′(H′ ∪ G′) grows
exponentially in the size of µ′(H′ ∪ G′).
Example 6. The following table presents the case m := 2.
A 4321
H 1100
0011
K 1010
1001
0110
0101
A′ 87654321
H′ 10100101
01011010
K′ 10011001
10010110
01101001
01100110
Z4 11000000
Z3 01110000
Z2 01011100
Z1 01010111
This also proves that for regular games (A,W), |λ′(W)| can grow exponentially in function of |µ′(W)|;
although |λ(W)| can be bounded linearly in function of |µ(W)| [18]. This result was already proven before,
using different techniques, in Corollary 4 of [9].
Our results translate the “bad news” of classical duality theory [3] to corresponding “bad news” for
the regular duality theory. But our polynomial-reduction-results would also guaranty that “good news”
for the regular cases translate to corresponding “good news” for the classical theory.
If we have a good algorithm to determine λ′(H′) from H′ := µ′(W), then using that algorithm is
certainly preferred to using the Hop-Skip-and-Jump algorithm of [18]. Suppose that for any regular game
Γ := (A,W), starting with H′ := µ′(W) we could determined K′ := λ′(W) in time polynomially bounded
by the input plus output size |A| · (|H′|+ |K′|). This does not contradict our Corollary 2; but according
to our Lemma 6 it would imply sensational good news for classical duality theory: It would prove that all
the so much investigated decision problems, that until now are only known to be quasi-polynomial [3],
are in fact polynomial.
So, summing up: The here developed critical considerations do not question Theorem 1 and 2, because
they refer to simple games. But if we would restrict the considered problems to regular games, then we
can not solve them polynomially any more. We do not even know if the decisive problem for regular
games Γ := (A,W) can be solved in quasi-polynomial time, in function of κ′(Γ ) := |A| · |µ′(W)|.
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6 Conclusions
As we have seen, strongness poses the main question: Given W ⊆ P(A), is W ∪ ¬(W) = P(A)?
If W is given explicitly, then obviously the question can be answered in time, that can polynomially
be bounded by the size |A| · |W| of the givenW . But ifW is monotone, thenW can implicitly be given by
H := µ(W). So, if we restrict the attention to simple games (A,W), as we did, then the size of the prob-
lems instances is |A| · |H|. And evaluating according to that unit of measurement, the strongness problem
becomes coNP-complete; unless we restrict the scope even more, to proper games, for which W ⊆ τ(H)
holds. Then strongness can be decided in time that can be bounded by a sub-exponential function of
the size of H. But the corresponding quasi-polynomial algorithms are definitely super-polynomial. To
guaranty polynomiallity, it seems that one has to restrict the universe to instances W that are “more-
than-proper”. For example, if A = {n, . . . , 1} and for all considered instances ν′(H) ⊆ τ ′(H) holds,
then ν(H) ⊆ ν′(H) ⊆ τ ′(H) ⊆ τ(H); so strongness ν(H) ⊇ τ(H) implies regularity. Hence, to decide
strongness, one can first examine regularity and, if the answer is positive, decide the strongness of the
regular game. All, of course, in time polynomial in |A| · |H|. In Section 4 we derived a similar result
for weighted instances; which in fact are dually characterized by the, properness implying, “more than
proper” condition of Lemma 3.
However, weighted instancesW will often not be given stating explicitly H := µ(W). Usually they will
be defined implicitly, explicitly giving only a corresponding threshold criterion (p, q). Then, measuring
computational time according to the size of (p, q) —which of course is much smaller than |A| · |H|—
the strongness problem turns out to be coNP-complete; as is well known [4]. Again we could focus on a
sub-universe: Suppose that A can be reordered such that A = {n, . . . , 1} and for all a ∈ A, p(a) = 2a.
Then there exists exactly oneX ∈ W , such that p(X) := Σ{p(a); a ∈ A} is minimal. So, to implicitly give
W , it suffices to explicitly exhibit this minimal winning coalition X ∈ W . The size of this X is |A|: very
small. Nonetheless, strongness can be decided in time polynomial in that small size: Simply determine
the maximal loser Y ⊆ A —the unique one, such that p(X) − 1 = p(Y )— and decide if A\Y ∈ W .
These considerations show that restricting our strongness problem to “more than proper” sub-universes
of simple games, sometimes, but not always, really reduces the problems complexity.
In Section 5 we proved that if instead of considering simple games we restrict the attention to
the regular ones, it does not reduce the problems complexity; because regular games can implicitly be
specified by codes that are much smaller than the ones needed to specify simple games. This turned
out to be the reason why —in Section 5— the strongness decision problem for simple games could be
polynomially reduced to its restriction to regular games. And the same holds if from the beginning we
restrict the attention to proper games. These results have, as we indicated, algorithmic implications.
Beyond that, they are also of interest for structural game theoretical considerations [20,21]. Because
our last Theorem 3 proves that one can extend the monomorphism T defined in Section 5, to define for
every simple game Γ := (A,W) a regular game Γ ′ := T (Γ ) := (A′, T (W)), such that the amount of
information needed to specify T (Γ ) is polynomial in the amount required by Γ . In this sense we may
conclude that the class of regular, i.e. ⊆′-monotone games, yields a structure that is at least as eloquent
as the class of simple, i.e. ⊆-monotone games; because this classical Boolean structure can economically
be interpreted in the here reconsidered regular structure.
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